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Abstract 1 
Anxiety and anxiety sensitivity are positively related to accuracy in the perception of bodily 2 
sensations. At the same time, research consistently reports that these traits are positively 3 
related to bias, resulting in the report of more and more intense symptoms that poorly 4 
correspond with physiological dysfunction. The aim of this study was to test the relationship 5 
of accuracy and bias in interoception. Furthermore, we tested the impact of individual 6 
differences in negative affect and symptom report in daily life on interoceptive accuracy and 7 
bias. 8 
Individuals higher in symptom report in daily life and negative affect were marginally 9 
more accurate in an interoceptive classification task in which participants were asked to 10 
identify different respiratory stimuli (inducing breathing effort) as belonging to a high or low 11 
intensity category. At the same time, bias in overestimating intensity of stimuli was 12 
significantly increased in participants higher in symptom report and negative affect, but only 13 
for more ambiguous stimuli. Results illustrate that interoceptive accuracy and bias need to be 14 
considered independently to understand their interaction with psychological factors and to 15 
disentangle (mis)perception of bodily sensations from liberal or conservative perceptual 16 
decision strategies. 17 
 18 
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Introduction 1 
Nothing is closer to us than our own body but few things seem so elusive than the perception 2 
of bodily sensations. The brain is not passively ‘measuring’ signals from the body, but these 3 
signals interact with emotions and influence decision-making, behavior, and attention which 4 
in turn can change (perception of) bodily signals (Craig, 2004; Damasio, 1994). It is thus little 5 
surprising that correlations between self-reported bodily sensations and physiological changes 6 
are usually low in healthy individuals and in patients with somatic disease (e.g., Banzett et al., 7 
2000; Petersen et al., 2011). Research consistently reports that negative affect, anxiety, and 8 
anxiety sensitivity are related to stronger nocebo effects (Van den Bergh et al., 1997; 2004) 9 
and higher levels of symptom report (Petersen et al., 2011; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). 10 
Furthermore, in anxiety disorders, elevated self-report of somatic sensations is combined with 11 
a tendency for catastrophizing interpretations (e.g., Barlow, 1988; Barsky et al., 1994; Caleton 12 
et al., 2014).  13 
In contrast to these low correlations between self-report and physiology particularly in 14 
individuals high in negative affect, a meta-analysis reports medium to strong effect sizes for a 15 
positive relationship between accuracy in heartbeat detection and psychological variables 16 
such as anxiety sensitivity and anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010). Higher anxiety sensitivity is 17 
also related to lower detection thresholds for respiratory stimuli (Petersen & Ritz, 2011).  18 
Furthermore, a study measuring respiratory-related evoked potentials (RREPs) in participants 19 
watching negative emotional pictures found increased later components of RREPs in 20 
individuals higher compared to lower in anxiety (von Leupoldt et al., 2011). The authors 21 
interpreted these increases as higher motivated attention towards respiratory signals in more 22 
anxious individuals in negative affective contexts. 23 
Thus, while individuals higher in negative affective states and traits seem to be more 24 
biased in interoception, they seem at the same time to be more accurate. Attempts to reconcile 25 
these seemingly paradox findings are faced with a methodological challenge. Research on 26 
4 
 
interoceptive accuracy uses mostly heartbeat detection tasks (e.g., Domschke et al., 2010). In 1 
one type of heartbeat detection task, participants are asked to decide whether a sound signal is 2 
matching their heartbeat (e.g., Asmundson, Sandler, Wilson, & Norton, 1993; Harver et al., 3 
1993). Data collected in such a task could be used to differentiate bias and accuracy in a 4 
signal detection approach. Unfortunately, performance levels are around chance in the 5 
majority of participants, raising questions about the usefulness of this paradigm (Jones, 1994; 6 
Domschke et al., 2010). Most studies on interoception use another type of heartbeat detection 7 
task and follow a mental tracking paradigm in which participants are instructed to count their 8 
heartbeats during intervals of different length (Schandry, 1981). This paradigm, however, 9 
cannot differentiate sensitivity and bias.  10 
Confounding sensitivity and bias means to lose crucial information. At the same level 11 
of sensitivity, individuals can apply liberal or conservative decision strategies which may 12 
result in very different forms of coping behavior following either a liberal “better safe than 13 
sorry” or a conservative “wait and see” approach (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004; Lynn & 14 
Barrett, 2014).  15 
Making perceptual decisions and classifying bodily sensations, for example, as 16 
symptom or as benign sensation, is an inherent part of interoception (Petersen et al., 2014) 17 
and may present a challenge (Carleton et al., 2014). A headache may be painful, but perhaps 18 
not painful enough to take medication; breathlessness may be strong, but perhaps not strong 19 
enough to signal that we should stop exercise; heartbeat may be elevated, but probably not a 20 
sign of a heart disease. Although these sensations are clearly above detection threshold they 21 
are ambiguous regarding their category. We cannot be 100% sure about classification of 22 
ambiguous sensations at the border of two interoceptive categories, but we can optimize 23 
decision strategies by weighting the risk of missing a symptom against the risk of false 24 
alarms, that is, the risk of classifying a benign sensation as pathological (Griffiths et al., 25 
2008). These processes of forming probabilistic beliefs about bodily sensations have been 26 
5 
 
suggested to underlie interoception at every stage of information processing and may not 1 
always be deliberate or even consciously accessible (Edwards et al., 2012).  2 
In this study, we tested the relationship between accuracy and bias in an interoceptive 3 
classification task in which participants were asked to correctly categorize different 4 
respiratory stimuli (respiratory loads increasing breathing effort) as belonging to either a low 5 
or a high intensity category and to indicate their place within these categories by labeling 6 
them as A1, A2, A3, A4, B1, B2, B3, and B4, with increasing numbers being related to 7 
increasing stimulus intensity (Petersen et al., 2014). A novel feature of this study is that we 8 
tested classification of a number of stimuli varying in intensity and assigned to two categories. 9 
Most signal detection paradigms test only one (usually low intensity) stimulus representing 10 
the signal against signal absent trials (for exceptions, see Yang et al., 2014; Kepecs et al., 11 
2008). Interoceptive categories, however, usually subsume a range of different signals (e.g., 12 
signs of airway obstruction in asthma may come in different degrees of intensity and a variety 13 
of symptoms on multiple dimensions may fall in the category ‘cold symptoms’) and an 14 
important task is to classify ambiguous signals as belonging to one of various sensation 15 
classes.  16 
We tested accuracy in the classification of multiple stimuli as belonging to one of the 17 
two intensity categories. Furthermore, we tested how bias changes across the different stimuli 18 
within interoceptive categories. We expected that it would be more challenging to classify 19 
sensations closer to the border of two interoceptive categories than for more 20 
prototypical/central sensations, for example, a stimulus which is not clearly high or low, 21 
but moderate. It is important to note that also if non categorization information would 22 
be given, an A1 stimulus would be more easily classified as low than an A4 stimulus. We 23 
tested whether interoceptive bias would be higher for more ambiguous sensations and 24 
whether individual differences in negative affect and symptom report in daily life would 25 
affect this bias. Higher increase in bias towards the shared category border could be 26 
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interpreted a strategy to rather risk false alarms than to miss signals which indicated 1 
potential harm (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Lower increase in bias towards the category 2 
border could be interpreted as the category border being incorporated into interoceptive 3 
decision making, serving as a red flag and reducing misclassification particularly for 4 
stimuli at this category border. 5 
We expected that higher bias for more ambiguous stimuli (better safe than sorry 6 
approach) would lead to more accurate results in the classification task (as predicted by 7 
Lynn & Barrett, 2014), explaining the seeming paradox of higher bias and higher 8 
accuracy in individuals with negative affective expectations towards symptoms or high 9 
in general negative affect.  10 
Methods 11 
Participants 12 
Participants were 54 women (mean age 21.04 years, SD=1.8) without known chronic or acute 13 
disease. They were selected based on prescreens for high and low habitual report of bodily 14 
symptoms in daily life using the Checklist for Symptoms in Daily Life (Wientjes & 15 
Grossman, 1994). Participants completed this symptom checklist consisting of 39 bodily 16 
sensations (e.g., tingling in arms and hands, back pain, etc.) with regard to how often they had 17 
experienced these sensations within the last year (scale 1 never -5 very often). The 18 
questionnaire has good reliability (Chronbach’s alpha .70-.90, Wientjes & Grossman, 1994). 19 
The pre-screen was filled in by 355 individuals and mean score was 91.95 (Standard 20 
Deviation SD = 18.59). We invited participants with values in the symptom checklist of either 21 
higher than 80 or lower than 60 consecutively from this prescreen list.  22 
Participants completed the same checklist also after the laboratory appointment. After 23 
the task, four participants from the high symptom reporter group did no longer reach high 24 
values on the symptom checklist and were excluded from the analysis. Thirteen of the 25 
7 
 
participants in the low symptom report group reached values of 61-75 on the symptom 1 
checklist after the task (which induced symptoms), and were included in the low symptom 2 
report group. This resulted in n=25 for the low symptom report group and n=25 for the high 3 
symptom report group. Participants signed informed consent prior to participation. They 4 
received course credit or reimbursement for participation. The study was approved by the 5 
local ethics committee. 6 
Instruments 7 
We induced feelings of breathing effort by presenting eight different respiratory loads using 8 
the instrument Powerbreathe K5 (POWERbreathe International Ltd., Southam, UK). The 9 
instrument allows gradually increasing breathing resistance at inhalation by reducing the 10 
diameter of the breathing port. We used the software Breathelink to program presentation of 11 
loads. Exhalation was unrestricted. Resistances of the eight respiratory loads were chosen to 12 
ensure that differences between adjacent breathing loads could be distinguished by healthy 13 
volunteers, but were similar enough to leave an uncertainty margin for classification (7, 9, 11, 14 
14, 18, 23, 28, and 37 cmH2O).  15 
 Participants completed the Checklist for Symptoms in Daily Life (Wientjes & 16 
Grossman, 1994) twice during the experimental session. Firstly, they were asked to indicate 17 
which of the symptoms they had perceived in the last year to test whether results of the pre-18 
screen were reliable. Secondly, we asked them to indicate which symptoms they had 19 
experienced during the actual task. We used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 20 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a five point rating scale assessing negative and positive 21 
affect within the last four weeks with ten mood related adjectives as items for each subscale.  22 
Protocol 23 
At the start of the protocol, participants signed an informed consent form giving information 24 
about the study. In the first block of the interoceptive classification task, we presented the 25 
8 
 
eight loads in random order, each load four times for two breaths. During presentation, the 1 
label of the load was presented on a computer screen (label A1 together with the 6 cmH2O 2 
load, A2- 9 cmH2O, A3 - 11 cmH2O, A4 - 14 cmH2O, label B1 - 18 cmH2O, B2 - 23 cmH2O, 3 
B3 - 28 cmH2O, and B4 - 36 cmH2O). Participants were instructed that in the following 4 
Block, they would have to solve a categorization task. They were asked to memorize the 5 
sensation and the label so that they would be able in a second block, when loads were 6 
presented without label, to indicate the correct category (A or B) and the location of the 7 
stimulus within its category (1-4). In a previous study, we found that participants are able to 8 
distinguish and label eight different loads assigned to two categories after this training 9 
procedure above chance level (average d’ for distinguishing loads within categories 1.0 - 1.6, 10 
Petersen et al., submitted). Furthermore, in two studies comparing a group of participants 11 
receiving category information and a control group receiving the information that 12 
stimuli were labelled with numbers only (increasing consecutively from lowest to highest 13 
stimulus), we found that categorization and an arbitrary category boundary indeed 14 
change perception of interoceptive stimuli. Differentiation between stimuli falling into 15 
the same categories was reduced and discrimination between categories was more 16 
pronounced in the experimental compared to the control group (Petersen et al., 2014; 17 
Petersen et al., in preparation). Similar results were found in studies on visual 18 
perception using arbitrary category boundaries in a similar paradigm (Corneille, 2002; 19 
Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), and in a study using an odor classification paradigm where mice 20 
were trained to classify six odor stimuli as belonging to one of two similar odor 21 
categories (Kepesc et al., 2008). 22 
In Block 2, loads were presented again in pseudo-randomized order with 18 23 
presentations per load, that is, 144 load presentations overall, with two breaths per load 24 
presentation. We presented the loads in a way that each load was preceded at least once by 25 
every other load to reduce the impact of order effects. Participants were asked to classify each 26 
9 
 
load by assigning the correct labels (A1-B4). They did not receive feedback on their 1 
performance. After Block 2, participants completed the PANAS, the symptom checklist for 2 
symptoms last year, and the symptom checklist for symptoms directly after the task. Finally, 3 
we asked them to answer demographic questions on age, height, weight, and chronic or acute 4 
disease. 5 
Data Analysis 6 
We used SPSS 20 for all analyses and used the SPSS syntax for c and d’ indices proposed by 7 
Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). We calculated d’class measures reflecting how accurate 8 
participants were in distinguishing categories A and B. In contrast to signal detection, 9 
classification is a choice between two types of signals and not between signal and noise. Still, 10 
the formula is identical, only that A or B is treated as ‘noise’ and the other category as 11 
‘signal’. We calculated one mean d’class index as mean of a d’Aclass (treating A as signal and B 12 
as noise) and d’Bclass (treating B as signal and A as noise).  13 
Furthermore, we used signal detection analysis to calculate classification criteria cclass. 14 
We calculated cclass = - (z(H) + z(F))/2, with z(H) as z-transformed hit rates of rating A if a 15 
load of category A was presented, and z(F) as z-transformed false alarm rates of reporting A1 16 
if a load from B was presented. This resulted in four cclass indices per category (cclassA1, cclassA2, 17 
cclassA3, cclassA4, cclassB1, cclassB2, cclassB3, and cclassB4). Thus, cclass reflects bias, taking into account 18 
classification errors and correct classification with c indices below zero indicating a liberal 19 
bias and c indices above zero indicating a conservative bias.  20 
In a classification paradigm, the meaning of the terms liberal and conservative 21 
depends on the standard used. A tendency to require little evidence to classify a stimulus 22 
as B is liberal in a “better safe than sorry” approach, if missing B is regarded to be more 23 
costly than missing A. We calculated cclass indices in a way that the term liberal refers to 24 
a decision strategy that favors classifying A as B for stimuli actually belonging to A, or 25 
10 
 
classifying B as A for stimuli actually belonging to B. In other words, a liberal tendency 1 
in our analysis is a strategy that favors misclassification. We expect this liberal tendency 2 
to be strongest for more ambiguous stimuli and to become weaker for clearly high or 3 
clearly low stimuli. 4 
We tested in a univariate ANOVA whether d’class would differ between groups of high 5 
and low habitual symptom reporters, controlling for negative affect and symptoms 6 
experienced during the task as covariates. Using repeated-measures ANCOVAs we tested 7 
whether cclass values would be significantly reduced as functions of closeness to the shared 8 
category border between A and B. The within-individual factor was Classification with four 9 
levels of the within-individual factor Classification per category (cclassA1, cclassA2, cclassA3, 10 
cclassA4/cclassB1, cclassB2, cclassB3, cclassB4). We included Symptom Report (high/low) as between-11 
individual variable to test whether individuals higher in habitual symptom report would show 12 
more liberal tendencies to assign stimuli to the B category. Again, we included negative affect 13 
and symptoms experienced during the task within the ANCOVA model as covariates.  14 
As alternative way of analysis, we performed an individual regression slopes 15 
analysis, following the procedure described by Pfister et al. (2013). In this analysis, we 16 
tested whether the individual regression slopes of participants indicating a decline 17 
towards a more liberal bias from A1 to A4 and an increase to more conservative bias 18 
from B1 to B4 would be steeper for participants in the High Symptom Report group. We 19 
compared the single slopes in a one way ANOVA with negative affect as covariate and 20 
symptoms reported directly  after the task included as control variable. Furthermore, 21 
we calculated the absolute value for the slopes across Category A and B and compared, 22 
whether steepness of slopes would differ between A and B in a repeated-measures 23 
ANCOVA with negative affect as covariate, controlling for symptoms experienced 24 
during the task. Furthermore, in the supplemental material we present data on accuracy 25 
of differentiation within categories.  26 
11 
 
Results 1 
Table1 summarizes mean values across groups of high and low symptom reporters for self-2 
report scales. We tested group differences in a t-test for independent groups. 3 
 4 
Table 1: Participants’ characteristics (standard deviations in parentheses) 5 
 Symptom experienced 
last year 
Negative affect Symptoms experienced 
during the task 
Low symptom reporters 60.12* (SD=7.05,    
range  42-75) 
16.84* 
(SD=7.10,   
range 10-34) 
57.04* (SD=9.24,  
range 41-75) 
High symptom reporters 99.88 (SD=14.06,   
range  81-138) 
24.48 (SD=7.84, 
range 11-28) 
78.68 (SD=16.47,  
range 41-107) 
* p<.001 6 
 7 
Accuracy of classification 8 
High symptom reporters were marginally more accurate classifying loads as A or B, main 9 
effect for Symptom Report F(1,49)=3.60, p=.064, ηp2=.073 (Figure 1). Effects for negative 10 
affect and symptoms reported during the task were not significant, Fs<1. 11 
Misclassifications and response bias 12 
Classification bias cclass per load became less conservative towards the shared category border 13 
between A and B in both groups, but this decrease was significant only for Category A 14 
F(3,44)=18.27, p<.001, ηp2=.555, and not for Category B F(3,44)=2.06 , p=.119, ηp2=.123 15 
(Figure 2, statistics are reported with the covariate Negative Affect). Please note that the 16 
lack of significant results for Category B does not necessarily imply that the effect for 17 
Category A was larger than for Category B. In the next section, we report a comparison 18 
12 
 
of effects with individual slope analysis. The decrease in Category A, was significantly 1 
stronger in high symptom reporters, interaction Classification X Symptom Report 2 
F(3,44)=3.97, p=.014, ηp2=.213. This interaction was non-significant for category B, 3 
F(3,44)=1.65 , p=.192, ηp2=.101. In other words, across Category A, participants high in 4 
habitual symptom report showed a more pronounced change from a conservative to a liberal 5 
criterion than participants low in habitual symptom report. Also after exclusion of the 6 
covariate Negative Affect from this model, the interaction effect of Classification X 7 
Symptom Report remained significant, F(3,44)=3.18, p=.033, ηp2=.175. 8 
For Category A, the interaction of the within-individual factor Classification with the 9 
covariate Negative Affect was marginally significant, F(3,44)=2.29 , p=.092 , ηp2=.135, but 10 
not for Category B, F(3,46)=2.06, p=.120, ηp2=.123. None of the other effects was significant 11 
(all Fs<1.18).  12 
Post hoc tests revealed that none of the single cclass indices differed significantly 13 
between groups regardless whether negative affect was included in the model or not (all 14 
ps>.103). We performed explorative post hoc tests with t-tests for independent groups to 15 
test whether the cclass index for A4 indicated indeed a liberal bias or only a less 16 
conservative bias.  This explorative t-test testing differences from zero, suggests that only for 17 
high habitual symptom reporters, cclass for A4 was significantly smaller than zero, that is, only 18 
in this group  bias changed significantly from conservative to liberal t(24)=-2.327, p=.027. 19 
Individual slopes analysis 20 
Individual slopes analysis revealed that the shift towards a liberal bias (as expressed in a 21 
negative slope for Category A) was stronger in the High Symptom Report group (mean -22 
.386, SD=.143) compared to the Low Symptom Report group (mean -.357, SD=.126), 23 
F(1,47)=4.59, p=.037, ηp2=.089. The effect of negative affect was non-significant and we 24 
report statistics without including negative affect as covariate. For Category B, the shift 25 
to a more conservative bias from B1 to B4 did not differ significantly between groups of 26 
13 
 
Low (mean .366, SD=.159) and High Symptom Report (mean .293, SD=.184), 1 
F(1,47)=2.34, p=.128, ηp2=.049. Comparing the absolute value of single slopes (ignoring 2 
the direction of slope) in a repeated-measures ANCOVA revealed that the steepness of 3 
slope was marginally higher for Category A (mean .375, SD=.125) than for Category B 4 
(mean .339, SD=.155), main within-individual effect F(1,46)=3.27, p=.077, ηp2=.065. The 5 
interaction with the between-individual factor Symptom Report was significant, 6 
F(1,47)=4.64, p=.036, ηp2=.090. While for participants from the Low Symptom Report 7 
group the absolute amount of slopes for Category A (mean .357, SD=.126) and B (mean 8 
.366, SD=.158) were not significantly different (p=.828), the absolute amount of slopes 9 
differed significantly for the High Symptom Report group between Category A (mean 10 
.392, SD=.125) and B (mean .311, SD=.150) with a steeper slope for Category A. In other 11 
words, change in bias across categories was stronger for category A than for Category 12 
B, but only in the High Symptom Report group. Again negative affect had no significant 13 
effect and including it did not change patterns of significance and we report results 14 
without including this covariate. 15 
Correlations between bias and accuracy 16 
Correlations (Pearson`s correlation coefficient, two-tailed, Figure 3) between d’class and cclass 17 
were negative for category A, but significant for stimulus A4 only. In other words, higher 18 
accuracy was related to a more liberal decision criterion for the stimulus at the category 19 
border of A. This ‘better safe than sorry’ approach for this particularly ambiguous stimulus 20 
was related to overall better classification results.  Furthermore, d’class was significantly 21 
positively related to cclass for stimulus B1 and B2, that is, higher accuracy was related to a 22 
more conservative decision criterion (being reluctant to decide that stimuli B1 and B2 23 
belonged to A) for stimuli at the border of category B. None of the other correlations was 24 
significant, p>.053.  25 
 26 
14 
 
Discussion 1 
Participants higher in symptom report in daily life scored higher on negative affect and 2 
reported more symptoms during the experimental task. They were also marginally more 3 
accurate in the interoceptive classification task. This is consistent with results of prior 4 
research showing a relationship between interoceptive accuracy/awareness and negative 5 
affective traits and states (e.g., Domschke et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2011; Von Leupoldt et 6 
al., 2011). A novel finding of this study is that classification strategies changed across 7 
categories. Bias became more liberal with increasing closeness to the border between 8 
categories. This change from conservative to more liberal decision strategies was significantly 9 
stronger in high symptom reporters and positively related to classification sensitivity d’class. 10 
Furthermore, for Category A (but not for B), the decline of individual slopes was steeper 11 
in the High compared to the Low Symptom Report group. Thus, the information that 12 
there was a category border between A4 and B1 was effectively reducing bias towards 13 
the category border, but only in participants who did not have strong affective 14 
expectations (e.g., fear of suffocation) about stimuli. 15 
Results confirm hypotheses proposed recently in signal detection research. Lynn and 16 
Barrett (2014) have suggested that increased uncertainty about visual stimuli will lead to more 17 
extreme decision strategies in signal detection tasks. These more extreme strategies for more 18 
ambiguous stimuli are suggested to optimize decision making and behavior (Lynn et al., 19 
2012). Lynn and Barrett (2014) give the example of a person who walks more carefully in a 20 
dimly lit room compared to a brightly lit room (i.e., under higher or lower ambiguity of visual 21 
signals). Optimizing speed relative to sight allows avoiding injury or breaking objects. They 22 
suggest that “extreme bias may reflect not an impairment, but a normal adaptive mechanism 23 
that offsets the single impairment, poor sensitivity“ (Lynn & Barrett, 2014, p. 1670). 24 
Calibrating bias to increased uncertainty for ambiguous sensations (closer to category 25 
borders) may be highly adaptive. More extreme decision strategies under higher ambiguity 26 
15 
 
(closeness to category borders) were more successful in the present study. Higher 1 
classification accuracy (d’class) was related to more bias at the borders of categories and 2 
increased bias in this laboratory task was related to bias in symptom report in daily life.  3 
It is important to note that the border of the two neutrally labeled categories A 4 
and B was not intrinsically meaningful, as it would be the case for a border that marks a 5 
transition between a sensation and a symptom category (e.g., increased airway 6 
resistance which is either benign or indicates an oncoming asthma attack). It could be 7 
questioned whether arbitrary category boundaries as such affected perception. Prior 8 
research using a design with an experimental group receiving category information and 9 
a control group for which stimuli were numbered consecutively from lowest to highest 10 
without categories has found that arbitrary category boundaries between categories A 11 
and B affect interoception (Petersen et al., 2014; Petersen et al., in preparation). 12 
Differentiation between categories was increased compared to differentiation within 13 
categories in the experimental group (receiving category information) compared to 14 
differentiation between identical stimuli in control groups (not receiving category 15 
information). These effects have also been found for visual perception (e.g., Corneille et 16 
al., 2002, Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Furthermore, a study testing classification decisions 17 
in mice which were trained to classify six odor stimuli as belonging to two categories 18 
(which shared a boundary and for which similarity between stimulus A3 and B1 was the 19 
same as between A3 and A2) found that detection of higher ambiguity for stimuli closer 20 
to category boundaries does not require meta-cognition and that ambiguity determines 21 
speed of decisions, overall accuracy, and is correlated with prefrontal cortex activity 22 
(Kepecs et al., 2008). For meaningful category labels and borders, or a paradigm which 23 
would trigger meta-cognition in participants about the costs of misclassifying stimuli, 24 
results might be even stronger than observed in this minimal paradigm using neutral 25 
labels.  26 
16 
 
It is tempting to speculate that the observed increasingly liberal bias for ambiguous 1 
stimuli at category borders in high symptom reporters may be a first step towards 2 
interoceptive threat-generalization. If a stimulus at a category border is consistently 3 
misclassified as belonging to a more intense category, this may lead in the long run to 4 
establishing a new and lower category border. This process may continue until more and more 5 
stimuli, which were initially in a low (or “safe sensation”) category, are subsumed in a higher 6 
(or “dangerous symptom”) category. Following this lead, fear-generalization in anxiety 7 
disorders (Lissek et al., 2008) may be interpreted as increasingly more liberal strategies 8 
spreading from category borders to more and more stimuli within a category.  9 
Ambiguity of sensations because of their location close to a category border and no 10 
longer clearly low or clearly high may be clinically as relevant as a poor signal to noise ratio 11 
of sensations (i.e., detection of minimal stimulation such as heartbeat at rest). Research on the 12 
role of uncertainty in panic disorder found that intolerance of uncertainty was substantially 13 
and significantly related to symptom report in panic disorder even after controlling for anxiety 14 
sensitivity (Carleton et al., 2014). Results from this correlational study suggest that patients 15 
seemed to find uncertainty about the decision whether a clearly detectable sensation is a sign 16 
of pathology (or not) at least as aversive as the sensation as such. Probing deeper into 17 
interoceptive classification strategies in anxiety disorder, future research should test whether 18 
the relationship of negative affective states and traits and interoceptive accuracy and bias is 19 
mediated by increased feelings of aversiveness related to uncertainty about classification of 20 
sensations as pathological or benign. Trait constructs such as intolerance for ambiguity which 21 
are closely related to anxiety may be interesting in that regard (Birrell et al., 2011). 22 
 Negative affect was increased in individuals high in habitual symptom report. 23 
Negative affect has been suggested to be related to a general lack of inhibition and not 24 
specifically to interoception (Bogaerts et al., accepted), but again, our results suggest that this 25 
effect is not a general effect across all types of stimuli within a category, but higher for more 26 
17 
 
ambiguous stimuli. The relationship between negative affect and perceptual bias has been 1 
confirmed in a large number of studies (e.g. Bar-Heim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010), 2 
but testing decision strategies under uncertainty may help to shed light on the processes 3 
underlying this relationship.  4 
A limitation for generalization of the present results is that categories were distinct and 5 
defined only by one dimension (inspiratory resistance). Interoceptive categories are 6 
multidimensional and may overlap on some dimensions and be distinct on others. Sensations 7 
experienced during an asthma attack, for example, and sensations related to panic attacks 8 
belong to two distinct diagnostic categories, but are partly overlapping in how they are 9 
experienced by patients (Lehrer et al., 2002). Multidimensionality and overlap of categories in 10 
interoception may increase ambiguity of sensations, which in turn may lead to more extreme 11 
forms of bias for ambiguous sensations. 12 
A further important limitation of this study is that we included only young female 13 
participants. Attention to interoceptive stimuli as well as expression of negative affect and 14 
fear may be higher in women than in men. Future research needs to address gender and age 15 
differences in interoceptive classification.  16 
Conclusion 17 
The relationship between sensitivity and bias is not uniform across interoceptive categories. 18 
To understand the relationship between interoception and individual difference variables, 19 
paradigms are needed which do not confound sensitivity and bias and vary the degree of 20 
ambiguity stimuli have regarding their classification.  21 
 22 
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Figure Captions 1 
 2 
 3 
Figure 1: Accuracy in classifying loads as belonging to A or B. Error bars represent standard 4 
errors of the mean. 5 
 6 
Figure 2: Cclass values calculated from z-transformed correct identification rates of a load as A 7 
or B and z-transformed false alarm rates. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 8 
 9 
Figure 3: Correlation coefficients between cclass indices and d’class (**p<.01). 10 
 11 
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